Author Archives: Export Compliance Solutions

DDTC Proposes to Align ITAR Foreign Nationality Rules with EAR

On February 2, 2022, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued a proposed rule (87 FR 5759) that would make multiple revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  The most significant of these revisions would scale back the longstanding approach toward determining the nationality of foreign persons, to an approach more in line with the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

Currently, the ITAR definitions of export and reexport include the statement:

Any release… of technical data to a foreign person is deemed to be an [export or reexport] to all countries in which the foreign person has held or holds citizenship or holds permanent residency.

Under these definitions, current nationality is considered as well as any other nationality, even if no longer held.  The result of this is that foreign persons originally from a third country, particularly those from § 126.1 prohibited destinations, are either barred from ITAR work or require more complex authorizations.

The revised definitions state:

Any release… of technical data to a foreign person is deemed to be an export to all countries in which the foreign person holds citizenship or permanent residency.

It will remain possible for a foreign person to have multiple nationalities, but will not require consideration of former nationalities.

The proposed approach is much closer to the EAR definitions, which state:

Any release… is a deemed [export or reexport] to the foreign person’s most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency

The proposed definition is also in line with the definition of U.S. person, which looks only at whether someone is a U.S. citizen, permanent resident, or one of a limited set of other immigration statuses.  A lawful permanent resident of the U.S. who once held another foreign nationality, including from a § 126.1 country, is unambiguously a U.S. person.

The proposed rule also makes a series of corrections and clarifications to:

  • 126.5(b) (Canadian exemptions),
  • 126.18(c)(2) (Exemptions regarding intra-company, intra-organization, and intra-governmental transfers to employees who are dual nationals or third-country nationals), and
  • 127.12 (Voluntary disclosures).

For additional information and how to submit comments, please refer to the Federal Register Notice.  Comments will be accepted through April 4, 2022.  As it is a proposed rule, the changes will not take effect until a final rule is published.

New Export Restrictions for Cambodia: § 126.1 Prohibited Destination and EAR Military End User Rule Now Apply!

Cambodia Added to ITAR §126.1 Prohibited Destinations

On December 9, 2021, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued a new rule (86 FR 70053) that adds Cambodia to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) § 126.1 list of prohibited destinations.  After Russia and Ethiopia, this is the third country added to § 126.1 this year.

The primary rationale of the new listing is the military presence and other activities in Cambodia by the People’s Republic of China, particularly the construction of exclusive-use facilities on the Gulf of Thailand.  Corruption and human rights abuses were also identified as concerns leading to the § 126.1 listing (see the OFAC advisory below for more background).

Cambodia is now listed in § 126.1(o) with case-by-case exceptions related to conventional weapons destruction and humanitarian demining activities.

While the main effect of this change will be that defense articles may no longer be exported or reexported to or imported from Cambodia, there are a number of follow-on effects of the §126.1 listing that companies need to be aware of, including:

  • Proposed and final sales: Broad prohibition includes proposals and presentations as well as actual sales and exports.
  • Disclosures: An affirmative duty to immediately inform DDTC of any “proposed, final, or actual sale, export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer of articles, services, or data.”
  • Exemptions: Most exemptions are not available for § 126.1 countries.
  • Dual/Third Country Nationals: § 126.18(c)(2) will require screening for substantive contacts with Cambodia.
  • Brokering: Additional restrictions under Part 129.

The listing was effective on the date of publication, December 9th.  Cambodia had previously been removed from the list of prohibited destinations in 1994.

Cambodia Faces New EAR Restrictions

Also on December 9, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a new rule (86 FR 70015) making parallel changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

Based on the same rationale provided in the § 126.1 notice, Cambodia has been added to the following EAR lists:

  1. Countries subject to the licensing policy in EAR § 742.4(b)(7) (review policy for national security controlled items, based on risk of diversion to military end user or end use),
  2. Countries subject to military end use and end user controls in § 744.21,
  3. Countries subject to military intelligence end use and end user controls in § 744.22, and
  4. Countries subject to a U.S. arms embargo under Country Group D:5.

Five Countries Now Subject to MEU

Cambodia joins Burma, China, Russia, and Venezuela as subject to the military and military intelligence end use and end user controls.  Although no entity in Cambodia has yet been identified as a “Military End User” (MEU) in Supplement No. 7 to Part 744, it is important to note that the MEU List is not an exclusive list of parties subject to the MEU restrictions.  Careful evaluation of potential exports to those five countries is advised.  Even business entities may be considered “military end users” which are defined broadly to include “any person or entity whose actions or functions are intended to support ‘military end uses.’”

Although apparently due to oversight, BIS has not formally added Russia or Ethiopia to Country Group D:5, they are both considered D:5 countries because the ITAR § 126.1 list is controlling (see Footnote 1 to Country Group D).

OFAC Publishes Cambodia Business Advisory

In a related development, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published a business advisory for Cambodia on November 10, 2021.

The “Cambodia Business Advisory on High-Risk Investments and Interactions” was issued “to caution U.S. businesses currently operating in or considering operating in Cambodia to be mindful of interactions with entities and sectors potentially involved in human rights abuses, criminal activities, and corrupt business practices.”  Specific business sectors include financial, real estate, casino, infrastructure, manufacturing, and timber as well as entities involved in trafficking persons, wildlife, and narcotics.  Forced labor is a particular concern for manufacturing.

The advisory details known problems in Cambodia, as well as relevant U.S. laws and regulations related to financial and supply chain and links to a number of U.S. government reports on the situation in Cambodia.  This report preceded the ITAR and EAR actions described above, but remains relevant for activities that are not specifically prohibited.

More Controls Emerging from BIS—Cybersecurity, Brain-Computer Interface Technology Controls -SAVE THIS ONE!

Since our last update, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has released a small flurry of new and proposed technology controls, continuing its review of emerging technologies required by ECRA and ongoing negotiations within the Wassenaar Arrangement.

BIS Expands Controls on Cybersecurity Items, Creates New License Exception ACE

On October 21, 2021, BIS published an interim final rule with request for comments (86 FR 58205) which would expand controls on cybersecurity items, but also creates a new license exception authorizing exports in many circumstances.

The new rule would create new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 4A005 and 4D004, new paragraph 4E001.c, and a revised 4E001.a and 5A001.j.  According to BIS, “These items warrant controls because these tools could be used for surveillance, espionage, or other actions that disrupt, deny or degrade the network or devices on it.”

License Exception Authorized Cybersecurity Exports (ACE) would be created in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) §740.22.  The new exception would allow “the export, reexport and transfer (in-country) of ‘cybersecurity items’ to most destinations, except to destinations listed in Country Groups E:1 and E:2” (currently Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria), with some differentiation between government and non-government end-users and end-use restrictions.

For additional information and how to submit comments, please refer to the Federal Register Notice.  Comments will be accepted through December 6, 2021.

The interim final rule is effective January 19, 2022 if not revised.

BIS Proposes Restrictions on STA Exception

On October 22, 2021, BIS published a proposed rule (86 FR 58615) which would “clarify and expand restrictions on the availability of License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization” (STA).

The proposed rule would affect certain Category 9 ECCNS, restrict the availability of STA for ECCNs 1E001 and 2E003.f, and make conforming changes to STA and the affected ECCNs.  The proposed changes are largely related to gas turbine engine hot section parts and components, but may also affect other industries such as optics.

For additional information and how to submit comments, please refer to the Federal Register Notice.  Comments will be accepted through December 6, 2021.

BIS Requests Comments on Brain-Computer Interface Controls

On October 26, 2021, BIS published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) (86 FR 59070) regarding potential emerging technologies controls on Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) technology.

Examples of BCI technology include neural-controlled interfaces, mind-machine interfaces, direct neural interfaces, and brain-machine interfaces.  This follows a November 19, 2018 ANPRM, the comments of which are summarized in the current notice.

BIS is seeking comments on the impact of BCI on U.S. national security and how to ensure that any controls would be “effective (in terms of protecting U.S. national security interests) and appropriate (with respect to minimizing their potential impact on legitimate commercial or scientific applications).”

Comments are specifically requested on the following topics:

  1. What specific uniform standards for BCI technology would need to be adopted to ensure their application on a global basis (i.e., as international standards for BCI technology)?
  2. Where does the development of BCI in the United States stand with respect to other countries (e.g., is the United States on the forefront of BCI technology development)?
  3. Is BCI technology currently available for commercial use in certain foreign countries and, if so, where and for what specific purposes (e.g., have foreign companies already developed devices or chips for specific commercial applications)?
  4. Has the current stage of development with respect to invasive and/or non-invasive BCI technology reached the point at which such technology is ready for commercial production and use?
  5. Is the main progress with respect to non-invasive brain signal sensors being made in terms of real-time algorithms designed to transform neural signals into commands ( i.e., what is developing faster: “software” (algorithms) or hardware (sensors))?
  6. What impact would the establishment of export controls on BCI technology have on U.S. technological leadership (i.e., not only in the field of BCI technology, but overall) and would this impact be distinctly different if controls were placed primarily on “software” as opposed to hardware, or vice versa?
  7. How is the future development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology or other emerging technologies likely to impact the development of BCI technology, or vice versa ?
  8. What types of ethical or policy issues are likely to arise from the use of BCI technology (e.g., for medical or military purposes)?
  9. What kinds of risks and benefits currently exist, or are likely to arise, as a result of the application of BCI technology?
  10. What are the potential advantages or disadvantages of using invasive and non-invasive BCI chips/sensors and related “software” (e.g., algorithms for signal processing) for specific applications? To what extent would these advantages or disadvantages correspond (or differ) based upon whether invasive or non-invasive BCI chips/sensors and related “software” were being used?
  11. Are there any BCI technologies that are significantly more vulnerable than others to cybersecurity threats (e.g., military systems employing BCI technologies that could adversely impact U.S. biodefense)?
  12. What is the potential for transmitted BCI data to be hacked or manipulated to influence the user or machine? Is such data inherently more vulnerable to hacking or manipulation than other forms of data? Would the invasive or non-invasive characteristics of BCI data have any impact on the potential vulnerability of such data?

BIS also encourages comments that would help it to determine:

  1. Which aspects of BCI technology would be more likely to require monitoring by the U.S. Government (USG); and
  2. Whether specific USG policies and regulations, as well as industry standards, need to be established before this technology becomes widely available for use in commercial applications.

Other related comments may also be welcome.  For additional information and how to submit comments, please refer to the Federal Register Notice.  Comments will be accepted through December 10, 2021.

ITAR Update: Ethiopia Formally Added to 126.1

On November 1, 2021, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) published a rule (86 FR 60165) officially adding Ethiopia to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) §126.1 list of prohibited destinations.  This change has been anticipated since September 17, 2021.

Ethiopia is now listed under §126.1(n) with the following policy:

(n) Ethiopia. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses or other approvals for exports of defense articles or defense services destined to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of Ethiopia.

The entry for Eritrea under §126.1(h) was also revised to reflect a similar policy:

(h) Eritrea. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses or other approvals for exports of defense articles or defense services destined to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of Eritrea.

Minor revisions were also made to the table heading for §126.1(d)(1) and §126.1(d)(2).  The addition of Ethiopia was originally announced on September 17, 2021 on the DDTC website and the new §126.1 entries took effect immediately with the November 1st Federal Register Notice.

Export Compliance Recap: Ethiopia to be added to ITAR 126.1 and EAR Country Group D:5. Changes to Policy for Cyprus, EAR Controls, and More!

Ethiopia Sanctions and 126.1

Following the announcement of sanctions targeting the conflict in Ethiopia on September 17, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) announced on its website that it intends to add Ethiopia to ITAR §126.1 and revise the entry for Eritrea.

While the main effect of this change will be that defense articles may no longer be exported or reexported to Ethiopia (where approvals would already have been unlikely), there are a number of follow-on effects of the §126.1 listing that may catch some companies by surprise.  Such effects include the following:

  • Proposed and final sales: Broad prohibition includes proposals and presentations as well as actual sales and exports.
  • Disclosures: An affirmative duty to immediately inform DDTC of any “proposed, final, or actual sale, export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer of articles, services, or data.”
  • Exemptions: Most exemptions are not available for §126.1 countries.
  • Dual/Third Country Nationals: §126.18(c)(2) will require screening for substantive contacts with Russia.
  • Brokering: Additional restrictions under Part 129.

Through its addition to §126.1, Ethiopia will also be added to the Commerce Department’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Country Group D:5.

Ethiopia will be the second addition to §126.1 this year, following Russia’s listing in March.

Cyprus §126.1 Revision Extended

In other ITAR §126.1 news, last year’s temporary modification of the policy towards Cyprus was extended for another year.  The modification potentially allowing the export of non-lethal defense articles and services is now in effect until September 30, 2022, unless extended (86 FR 54044).

Cyprus, a member of the European Union since 2004, was originally listed in §126.1 with the objective to prevent an arms race on the island.  Cyprus is currently divided between the Republic of Cyprus and the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a division which followed the 1974 Turkish invasion.  The relaxed §126.1 policies are based on the cooperation of Cyprus on additional U.S. foreign policy objectives of anti-money laundering and denial of ports for Russian military vessels.

USML Category XI(b) Extended for Five Years

In what had become an annual or biennial event, on August 30, 2021 DDTC published a notice (86 FR 48021) continuing the current text controlling intelligence-analytics software in USML Category XI(b).  DDTC and its interagency partners have been unable to resolve how Category XI controls such software, and are now deferring to a wholesale revision of the category expected by 2026.

Export Control Reform measures were originally scheduled to remove “software” from XI(b) as well as the capability to analyze and produce information from the electromagnetic spectrum.  Some software would remain controlled under XI(d).  Based concerns that a revised category would no longer clearly control “certain intelligence-analytics software,” DDTC has continued to “amend” XI(b) to maintain the original text.

DTAG Meeting Announced

On September 24, 2021, DDTC published a notice (86 FR 53137) announcing that the next Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) open meeting will be on November 4, 2021.  The meeting will be held virtually with discussion on the following topics:

(1) Advise on best practices for conducting internal audits to evaluate ITAR compliance programs, and

(2) provide sources for recordkeeping and reporting requirements for all licenses, agreements, and exemptions, as well as industry perceptions of the return on investment of said requirements, plus any recommendations for improvement.

The meeting is open the public and accepts questions by email.  For more information on the meeting including how to register, please refer to the Federal Register Notice.

Commerce Revises EAR Controls

On August 19, 2021, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a rule (86 FR 46590) making corrections and clarifications to the “0x5zz” firearms Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs), including edits, new notes, and some changes to the ECCNs effective September 30, 2021.  Refer to the Federal Register Notice for more information.

On October 5, 2021, BIS published two separate rules (86 FR 54807 and 86 FR 54814).  The first rule makes a series of targeted editorial corrections and clarifications throughout the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).  The second establishes controls on nucleic acid assembler and synthesizer software under new ECCN 2D352, implementing an Australia Group decision from May 2021.  BIS also issued a press release on the new control.

On October 6, 2021, BIS and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued companion rules (86 FR 55492 and 86 FR 55476) transferring responsibility for licensing exports of deuterium for non-nuclear end use from the NRC to BIS.  Exports of deuterium for nuclear end use remain under NRC jurisdiction.  The revision affects ECCN 1C298, which currently includes graphite, and will take effect December 6, 2021.

Export Compliance Updates Roundup: Regular Employees, Russia, Wassenaar, TACs, and Antiboycott

DDTC Proposes Revised Definition of “Regular Employee”

On May 27, 2021, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued a proposed rule (86 FR 28503) to revise the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) §120.39 definition of “regular employee.”  Following temporary measures adopted for the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed amendment would permanently “allow certain individuals to work remotely, and further proposes to clarify the contractual relationships that meet the definition of regular employee.”  Significantly, the “criterion that an individual must work at a company’s facilities will be removed in the revised definition to allow for remote work.”  The proposed rule also clarifies the treatment of contract employees and the meaning of “long term contractual relationship” as well as consideration of security clearances and secondment.

“Regular employee” is a key definition in the ITAR §126.18 exemptions for dual nationals and third country nationals (DN/TCNs).  Under the 126.18 exemptions, foreign companies can allow access to ITAR-controlled articles and technical data by employees who are nationals of other countries without DDTC approval when the specific conditions are met.

Comments on the proposed definition will be accepted through July 26, 2021.  Please refer to the Federal Register Notice for the full proposal and how to comment.

In a related action, DDTC published a rule (86 FR 30778) on June 10, 2021 temporarily extending the suspension of certain ITAR provisions “to provide for continued telework operations during the current SARS-COV2 public health emergency.”  The suspension is intended to continue until the regular employee final rule is published.

Russia: 126.1 Policy and Country Group D:5

Following the addition of Russia to ITAR §126.1, DDTC has released a fact sheet summarizing the effect of the listing and several FAQs, with particular attention to the effect on commercial space launches.

The Department of Commerce has not yet amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Country Group D:5, which parallels ITAR §126.1.  However, Country Group D:5 includes the following note:

If there are any discrepancies between the list of countries in this table and the countries identified by the State Department as subject to a U.S. arms embargo (in the Federal Register), the State Department’s list of countries subject to U.S. arms embargoes shall be controlling.

Even without a formal EAR amendment, D:5 should be understood to contain Russia.

CCL Wassenaar Updates

On March 29, 2021, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a rule (86 FR 16482) to revise the Commerce Control List (CCL) to implement changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA List) that were decided upon at the December 2019 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting.  Other changes from the December 2019 meeting were published in 2020.

The recent changes are largely related to eliminating reporting requirements and license exceptions for some encryption items, but also include revisions to twenty-two Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) (0A502, 0A503, 0A606, 1A002, 1A005, 1A006, 1A613, 1B002, 1C001, 1C002, 1C006, 1C010, 2A001, 3B001, 3E002, 5A002, 6A004, 6A005, 6A008, 9A011, 9D515, and 9E003).

Opportunity to Influence Export Controls: BIS Seeks Technical Advisory Committee Members

On April 28, 2021, BIS published a notice (86 FR 22390) announcing the recruitment of candidates for its seven Technical Advisory Committees (TACs).  These committees advise the Commerce Department on the technical parameters and administration of export controls in the following areas of responsibility:

  1. Information Systems TAC: CCL Categories 3 (electronics), 4 (computers), and 5 (telecommunications and information security)
  2. Materials TAC: CCL Category 1 (materials, chemicals, microorganisms, and toxins)
  3. Materials Processing Equipment TAC: CCL Category 2 (materials processing)
  4. Sensors and Instrumentation TAC: CCL Category 6 (sensors and lasers)
  5. Transportation and Related Equipment TAC: CCL Categories 7 (navigation and avionics), 8 (marine), and 9 (propulsion systems, space vehicles, and related equipment)
  6. Emerging Technology TAC (identification of emerging and foundational technologies that may be developed over a period of five to ten years with potential dual-use applications)
  7. Regulations and Procedures TAC (focuses on the EAR and its implementation)

TAC members are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, serve terms of not more than four years, and must obtain secret-level security clearances prior to appointment.  Resumes will be accepted through September 30, 2021.  For more information, including how to apply, please refer to the Federal Register Notice.

UAE Removed from Treasury Antiboycott List

On April 8, 2021, the Department of the Treasury published a notice (86 FR 18374) removing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the list of countries which “require or may require participation in, or cooperation with, an international boycott.”

This list is routinely published for the purposes of compliance with Part 999 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, which includes reporting requirements for certain activities in the listed countries.

The UAE was removed following its August 2020 repeal of a law mandating a boycott of Israel and subsequent actions.  Last December’s version of the antiboycott list included a comment that anticipated the UAE’s removal following its normalization of relations with Israel.

The remaining countries on the list are:

  • Iraq
  • Kuwait
  • Lebanon
  • Libya
  • Qatar
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Syria
  • Yemen

While this removes one set of requirements specifically required for the UAE, EAR Part 760 (Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts) continues to apply to transactions with any country.

In addition, on June 9, 2021, BIS published an interpretation to Supplement No. 17 to Part 760 (86 FR 30535) which clarifies that some requests from the UAE are no longer presumed to be boycott-related if made after August 16, 2020.  This only addresses a presumption and the general requirements of Part 760 continue to apply.

Russia, Burma Face New Export Sanctions

Russia to Rejoin 126.1, Individuals and Entities Face Additional Sanctions

On March 2, 2021, the U.S. Department of State announced a series of new sanctions related to “The Russian Federation’s Use of a Chemical Weapon in the Attempted Assassination of Russian Opposition Figure Aleksey Navalny in August 2020 and his Subsequent Imprisonment in January 2021.”

The addition of Russia to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) §126.1 prohibited destination list, with limited exceptions for government space cooperation, expands on chemical weapons sanctions imposed in 2018, among others.  Including parallel actions by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), new sanctions include:

  • New individuals and entities sanctioned under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
  • New individuals and entities added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List).
  • New individuals and entities added to the Entity List.

While Russia has been treated more or less as a §126.1 country through both license review policies and its specific exclusion from the ITAR cloud rule at §120.54(a)(5), the listing will affect a number other ITAR compliance areas:

  • Proposed and final sales: Broad prohibition ranges from proposals and presentations to actual sales and exports.
  • Disclosures: An affirmative duty to immediately inform the Directorate of Defense Trade Control (DDTC) of any “proposed, final, or actual sale, export, transfer, reexport, or retransfer of articles, services, or data.”
  • Exemptions: Most exemptions are not available for 126.1 countries.
  • Dual/Third Country Nationals: §126.18(c)(2) will require screening for substantive contacts with Russia.
  • Brokering: Additional restrictions under Part 129.

The Department also published a fact sheet on the new sanctions.  Russia had been listed in §126.1 until April 3, 2006.  The new §126.1 listing will take effect through a Federal Register Notice that has not yet been published.

Burma Sanctioned Over Military Coup

On February 17, 2021, BIS published a notice (86 FR 10011) of a more restrictive license review policy and suspension of some license exceptions following the February 1st military coup in Burma.  On March 8, 2021, this was followed by two new rules (86 FR 13173 and 86 FR 13179).

The first rule amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to:

  • Move Burma from Country Group B to Country Group D:1, rendering many license exceptions unavailable;
  • Subject Burma to military end use and end user restrictions; and
  • Move Burma from Computer Tier 1 to Computer Tier 3 in the Computers (APP) license exception.

The second rule adds four Burmese entities to the Entity List, which imposes a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR under a license review policy of denial.

Sanctions on Burma had been relaxed in recent years, following improvements in human rights and democracy.  Burma was moved from Country Group D:1 to Country Group B in 2016, while remaining in Country Groups D:3 and D:5 (related to chemical and biological weapons proliferation concerns and arms embargoes).  In 2017, OFAC removed the Burmese Sanctions Regulations following the termination of the underlying Executive Order.

Burma has long been and remains ITAR §126.1 prohibited destination.

A Flurry of Activity – State, Commerce, and Treasury Rules Issued Ahead of Change in Administration

January saw a number of updates to export compliance regulations and policies to close out a number of Trump administration initiatives.  On January 20, 2021, the Biden administration announced a regulatory freeze.  How do these relate?  Read on.

Regulatory Freeze

Let’s start with the regulatory freeze, since what everyone wants to know is whether new rules are really going into effect or not.  The White House announcement requested executive agencies to (1) refrain in most cases from sending new rules to the Federal Register before review by new political appointees, (2) withdraw pending rules not yet published, and (3) postpone the effective dates of published but pending rules.  This is typical for changes in administrations.  Rules already published and effective may be revised in the future through normal administrative processes and we will report on notable changes.  Most of the changes below were effective before January 20th, with a few notable exceptions.

Commerce Updates Chemical Weapons Lists

On January 7, 2021, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a rule (86 FR 936), also effective January 7th, amending the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).  This amendment adds three chemical families and one chemical now controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and revises the definition of “production” of CWC chemicals.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is an international arms control treaty that seeks to eliminate chemical weapons by the parties to the treaty.  The parties have agreed to a number of restrictions for listed chemicals.  The new changes reflect decisions adopted at the November 2019 CWC Conference of the States Parties.

The specific chemicals are identified in the Federal Register Notice and the full list is in Part 745 of the EAR.  The revised definition of “production” applies to the CWCR only, not the EAR.

Commerce Clarifies Vaccine Controls

Also on and effective January 7, 2021, BIS published a rule (86 FR 944) clarifying controls on vaccines under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C991.

The new rule amends 1C991 to:

  1. Include vaccines containing or designed for use against pathogens and organisms listed under ECCNs 1C351, 1C353 or 1C354.  According to BIS:
    Prior to the effective date of this final rule, ECCN 1C991 indicated that it controlled vaccines “against” such items, but was not specific about whether all vaccines “containing” such items were controlled, irrespective of whether the vaccines were designed for use “against” such items.
  2. Control medical products containing genetically modified organisms and genetic elements described in ECCN 1C353.a.3 and adjust definitions.
  3. Renumber 1C991.c and .d based on level of export control.

These changes are based on a decision of the Australia Group June 2019 Plenary meeting.  The Australia Group is a multilateral forum for the harmonization of export controls related to chemical and biological weapons.

Commerce Unmanned Aerial Systems Licensing Policy Amended

On January 12, 2021, BIS published a final rule (86 FR 2252), also effective January 12th, which amends the Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) licensing policy in the EAR.

The amended policy replaces a presumption of denial with case-by-case review for systems with “a range and payload capability equal to or greater than 300 km/500 kg but a maximum true airspeed of less than 800 km/hr.”

A corresponding proposal was made to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multilateral export control group, but has not been adopted within the MTCR by the required consensus.  The change in U.S. review policy was announced in July 2020.

The Missile Technology licensing policy is located in the EAR at §742.5.

Commerce Removes Anti-Terrorism Controls on Sudan

As anticipated, on January 19, 2021, BIS issued a rule (86 FR 4929), effective January 14th, removing Anti-Terrorism (AT) controls for items destined for Sudan and removing Sudan from Country Group E:1.

Sudan’s removal is based on an agreement reached between the U.S. and Sudan in 2020 resolving claims related to victims of terrorism.  Sudan is now listed in Country Group B and is newly eligible for a number of license exceptions and the 25% de minimis level for U.S. content.  Notably, Sudan joins Ukraine as the only members of Country Group B not eligible for License Exception GBS (Shipments to Country Group B Countries, EAR §740.4).

Sudan remains subject to an arms embargo, as listed under ITAR §126.1(v) and EAR Country Group D:5.

As revised, there are currently no countries subject to AT controls except to the extent that Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria are subject to comprehensive sanctions.

U.S. Person Activities and ICTS Supply Chain Rules Issued, But Not Yet Effective

On January 15, 2021, BIS issued an interim final rule (86 FR 4865) imposing license requirements on specified U.S. person activities related to “nuclear explosive devices, missiles, chemical or biological weapons, whole plants for chemical weapons precursors, foreign maritime nuclear projects, and foreign military intelligence services.”  This rule is effective March 16, 2021 and may be subject to the regulatory freeze described above.  It would amend the EAR to control activities by U.S. persons wherever located regardless of whether the items involved are subject to the EAR.  Comments have been requested through March 1, 2021.

On January 19, 2021, BIS issued an interim final rule (86 FR 4909) that establishes regulations and requests comments on “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain.”  This rule is effective March 22, 2021 and may be subject to the regulatory freeze described above.  It is intended to provide a process to review information and communications technology and services (ICTS) supply chain transactions, “similar to the process by which entities may inform the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) of investments in U.S. businesses.”  A related proposal was published in November 2019.  Comments have been requested through March 22, 2021.

State Department Precision-Guided Munitions Policy Announced

On January 19, 2021, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) announced a policy for the review of direct commercial sale (DCS) precision-guided munitions (PGMs).  Notably, DDTC stated:

“…before authorizing DCS exports, reexports, or retransfer of U.S.-origin PGMs, their critical components, and/or related technical data or defense services, as enumerated below, the U.S. government will confirm the foreign end-user government possesses or is in the process of procuring sufficient U.S., indigenous, or third-party [advanced target development] capabilities…

No action will be required on the part of the U.S. applicant. A valid ATD solution is current for five years, after which the technical support and data need to be refreshed.  Within the five-year period of currency, in-scope licenses will be adjudicated as normal.”

This process is intended to ensure that U.S.-origin PGMs are used “consistent with U.S. intent when approving the transfer” including the ability to mitigate the risk of civilian casualties.

Civil Monetary Penalties Adjusted for Inflation

Inflationary adjustments to civil monetary penalties were issued by both the Department of Commerce (86 FR 1764) and the Department of State (86 FR 7804).  Maximum penalties depend on the specific kind of violation and both notices also update a number of additional regulatory penalties.

The ITAR §127.10 civil penalties were amended as follows:

  • § 127.10(a)(1)(i) increased from $1,183,736 to $1,197,728.
  • § 127.10(a)(1)(ii) increased from $860,683 to $870,856 (or five times the amount of the prohibited incentive payment, whichever is greater).
  • § 127.10(a)(1)(iii) increased from $1,024,457 to $1,036,566.

The Department of Commerce increased the maximum penalty for a violation of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 from $305,292 to $308,901.

OFAC Issues Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Regulations

On January 15, 2021, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a rule (86 FR 3793), also effective January 15th, creating the Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Regulations.  This is the latest step in a series of actions following Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy in 2020.  OFAC typically issues separate, but similar, sanctions regulations to implement country-specific sanctions.

ECS will continue to monitor changes to export control regulations and policies, particularly for DDTC, BIS, and OFAC.  Watch this space for updates!

Recent Updates to Commerce Country Policies

In a flurry of activity in December, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), updated licensing policies for countries near and far.  The updates will have notable impacts on license exemption availability as described below.

Hong Kong no Longer a Separate Destination

On December 23, 2020, BIS issued a final rule (85 FR 83765) removing Hong Kong as a separate destination under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).  This follows the July suspension “all License Exceptions for Hong Kong that provide differential treatment as compared to those available to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).”  The PRC imposed a new “national security law” in 2020 which reduced Hong Kong’s preexisting autonomy and increased the risk of diversion U.S. technology and hardware.

Changes to Country Groups for Ukraine-Removes an Exception
Mexico, and Cyprus Adds STA as an Exception but Cyprus still a D:5 Country

On December 28, 2020, BIS issued a final rule (85 FR 84211) which moves Ukraine from Country Group D to Country Group B and adds Mexico and Cyprus to Country Group A:6.

No changes were made to license requirements in the Commerce Country Chart.  Under the EAR, Country Groups are used to determine eligibility for many license exceptions.

Ukraine’s addition to Country Group A:6 is unique, as it specifically excludes eligibility for License Exception GBS (§740.4 Shipments to Group B Countries) and License Exception TSR (§740.6 Technology and Software under Restriction), but other license exceptions available to Group B countries do become available.  Under this change, General Prohibition Three (the Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) no longer applies to Ukraine.  EAR §746.6 continues to restrict exports to the Crimea Region of Ukraine.

The addition of Mexico and Cyprus to Country Group A:6 authorizes the use of License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) §740.20(c)(2) (controls of lesser sensitivity).

Cyprus remains an ITAR §126.1 country (with a recently updated licensing policy) and is still included in Country Group D:5.  Under EAR §740.2(a)(12) and (13), license exceptions are limited for 9×515 and 600 series items for Cyprus (and other D:5 countries)

These updates are based on: “(1) The Government of Ukraine’s continuing engagement with regional and international export control authorities; (2) Mexico’s multilateral export control regime memberships and national security approaches and interests compatible with the United States; and (3) Cyprus’ European Union membership and like-minded export controls.”

Sudan

On December 18, 2020, the Department of State published a notice rescinding Sudan’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.  This change was previously announced in October, subject to a 45-day Congressional notification window.  Sudan is currently the only country designated as requiring export licenses for Anti-Terrorism (AT) purposes on the Commerce Country Chart that is not subject to comprehensive restrictions.  This requirement has not yet been removed.

After the re-designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the list now includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.  All four are already subject to comprehensive export restrictions.

New Commerce and OFAC Sanctions Lists Include Communist Chinese Military Companies, Entity List Expanded

In separate, but related, December actions, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published new sanctions lists largely aimed at companies tied to the Chinese military.

The new lists build on the 2020 releases of the Department of Defense list of Communist Chinese military companies.  When first released, the presence of a company on that list was a “red flag,” but not a direct export restriction.  The use of the list by the Departments of Commerce and Treasury changes that.

Commerce Military End User List – NEW ADDITION UNDER SUPPLEMENT #7 OF EAR!

On December 23, 2020, BIS published a rule (85 FR 83793) adding the Military End User (MEU) List to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).  The list identifies 102 entities, fifty-seven in China and forty-five in Russia, that have been identified by the U.S. government as “military end users” subject to EAR §744.21.  §744.21 restricts the export, reexport, or transfer (in country) of items identified in Supplement No. 2 to part 744 to military end users in China, Russia, and Venezuela.  The restriction takes the form of a license requirement with a presumption of denial.  License exceptions other than GOV may not be used for those entities.

While long-awaited and very helpful for exporters, the MEU List is not an exclusive list of parties subject to the restrictions of §744.21.  Careful evaluation of potential exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela is advised as even business entities may be considered “military end users” which are defined broadly to include “any person or entity whose actions or functions are intended to support ‘military end uses.’”  In the event that a member of the Department of Defense list of Communist Chinese military companies is not included on the MEU list, it should be considered a “red flag” for export compliance review.

The new list is located at Supplement No. 7 to Part 744 of the EAR.

OFAC Chinese Military Companies Investment Ban

On November 12, 2020, the President issued Executive Order 13959 (85 FR 73185) titled “Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies,” prohibits trading in securities of any “Communist Chinese military company” effective January 11, 2021.

The order includes an annex listing Communist Chinese military companies based on the Department of Defense list and provides for expanding the list in the future.  As of January 8, 2021, the list reflects the three 2020 releases of the Department of Defense list.

To implement the order, OFAC has established the Non-SDN Communist Chinese Military Companies List (NS-CCMC) and has been regularly issuing FAQs on the topic.

Seventy-Seven MORE Added to Entity List

In another notable update, on December 22, 2020, BIS published a rule (85 FR 83416) which added seventy-seven entities to the EAR’s Entity List.  The new entries are located in the People’s Republic of China (China), Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Malta, Pakistan, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.).  The bulk of the new entries (60) are located in China.  The rule also removed four entities in Israel and the U.A.E. and revised two entries.  The Federal Register Notice contains the rationale for the additions, typically activity that is considered “contrary to the national security interests of the United States.”

BIS also issued a press release and a statement from Secretary Ross with additional background on the new Chinese entries.

Continuous Screening Recommended ACT NOW!

With the new Military End User List and the continued expansion of the Entity List, denied party screening requires the ongoing attention of export compliance personnel and programs.  Customers, as well as intermediate parties and end users must be screened before an export can take place.  With sanctions lists being updated on a nearly daily basis, continuous screening of those parties is the best way to keep up to date with changes.

BIS Updates: Wassenaar, Human Rights, and License Extensions!

We have a handful of developments out of the Commerce Department, with revisions to controlled items, human rights review, and license extensions.  At the end, there are two developments out of Middle East

Commerce Implements 2018 & 2019 Wassenaar Revisions

On September 11, 2020, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a rule (85 FR 56294) implementing changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies made at the December 2018 Plenary meeting.

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a global multilateral export control regime, covering both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.  Participants agree to control exports and retransfers of items on a control list of dual-use goods and technologies and munitions.  Its Plenary meeting normally occurs once a year in December in Vienna, Austria.  CCL revisions take effect when officially amended through a Federal Register notice

BIS previously issued a rule in May 2019 that added and revised five ECCNs based on the December 2018 Plenary meeting.  The new rule reflects the changes that were remaining:

Revisions to 28 ECCNs:

  • 0A617
  • 1C001
  • 2A001, 2B003, 2B006
  • 3A001, 3A002, 3B001, 3E003
  • 5E001, 5A002, 5D002, 5E002, 5E992
  • 6A003, 6A005,
  • 7A002, 7A003, 7A005, 7D003, 7D005,
  • 8A001, 8A002
  • 8B001, 9A010, 9A610, 9B001, & 9E003.

License Exception Revisions to ECCNs:

  • 1C004 (GBS)
  • 8A001 (LVS & STA)
  • 8D001 (TSR, STA)
  • 8E001 (TSR, STA)

New ECCN:

  • 6B002 (masks and reticles for optical sensors specified in 6A002.a.1.b or 6A002.a.1.d).

Conforming Changes to Eight ECCNs:

  • 0A606
  • 1A008
  • 3A991
  • 6A002, 6E001, 6E002
  • 8D001 & 8E001.

A series of corrections to the September ECCN revisions were published on December 4, 2020 (85 FR 78684), affecting some technical specifications and revising technical notes.

On October 5, 2020, BIS published a rule (85 FR 62583) implementing changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies made at the December 2019 Plenary meeting.  The changes harmonize the Commerce Control List (CCL) with the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement by adding six emerging technologies:

  1. Hybrid additive manufacturing/computer numerically controlled tools
  2. Computational lithography software designed for the fabrication of extreme ultraviolet masks
  3. Technology for finishing wafers for 5 nanometer integrated circuit production
  4. Digital forensics tools that circumvent authentication or authorization controls on a computer and extract raw data
  5. Software for monitoring and analysis of communications and metadata acquired from a telecommunications service provider via a handover interface
  6. Sub-orbital spacecraft

The specific Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) affected are as follows:

Revised: 2B001, 3D003, 5E001, 5A004, 9A004
Revised: 5D002, 5E002, 9A012, 9A515
Corrected: 5D001
Added: 3E004

Eligibility to use the License Exception ENC was also revised to include digital forensics items (investigative tools).

For complete details on the revisions, refer to the Federal Register Notice.  BIS also published a press release on these and related changes to the CCL.

Proposed Controls on Nucleic Acid Assembler and Synthesizer Software

On November 6, 2020, BIS published a proposed rule (85 FR 71012) which would control software related to nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers.  The proposed rule would create a new ECCN 2D352 related to existing ECCN 2B352.j.  Both ECCNs would be controlled under CB (chemical and biological weapons) column 2 and AT (anti-terrorism) column 1.  This proposal is in addition to current Wassenaar or Australia Group controls.  Comments may be submitted through December 21, 2020.

Commerce Announces Human Rights Reviews & Controls on Water Cannons

On October 6, 2020, BIS published a rule (85 FR 63007) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to provide for human rights review for items controlled for CC (crime control) purposes, as well as all license applications (“except for items controlled for short supply reasons”).  In the Federal Register Notice, BIS notes that:

BIS will generally consider license applications favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder in the country or region of destination or unless there is evidence that the government of the importing country may have violated internationally recognized human rights.

This follows on the September release of surveillance and human rights guidance by the Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

Also on October 6, 2020, BIS published a rule (85 FR 63009) which creates a license requirement for “water cannon systems for riot or crowd control and parts and components specially designed therefor.”  The new rule creates ECCNs 0A977, 0D977 and 0E977 which will require licenses for export to countries designated under CC (crime control) Column 1 of the Commerce Country Chart.

This action was directed by Public Law 116-77 “to prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force,” but also affects exports to other countries.  The license requirement will apply to most countries except for NATO allies and some other military allies and subjects water cannons to human rights review.

Revised National Security Review for China, Venezuela, and Russia

On October 29, 2020, BIS published a rule (85 FR 68448) “to revise the license review policy for items controlled for national security reasons destined to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Venezuela, or the Russian Federation (Russia).”  The focus of the policy will be whether the National Security (NS) controlled items “make a material contribution” to those countries’ weapons systems subject to a presumption of denial.

Commerce Offers License Extensions

On October 16, 2020, BIS announced that exporters may request a six-month extension for licenses due to expire on or before December 31, 2020.

Requests should be sent by email to LicenseExtensionRequest@bis.doc.gov and BIS expects to review and approve extensions within two to three business days.

Antiboycott & Anti-Terrorism Updates for UAE & Sudan?

Two developing stories that we are watching, but that have not yet been reflected in regulations are based on diplomatic agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Sudan.

The Department of the Treasury released its current list of “countries which require or may require participation in, or cooperation with, an international boycott” (85 FR 64615).  The list includes:

  • Iraq
  • Kuwait
  • Lebanon
  • Libya
  • Qatar
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Syria
  • United Arab Emirates
  • Yemen

There are no changes compared to last year’s release (84 FR 54730, October 10, 2019), but the notice does state that “Treasury is monitoring the situation of the United Arab Emirates, which has announced the issuance of a decree repealing its boycott law.”  The UAE and Israel recently agreed to normalization of relations.  A similar agreement was reached between Israel and Bahrain, but Bahrain was not included on the Treasury list.

On October 23, 2020, the White House announced the President’s intention to “formally rescind Sudan’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.”  This action is based on an agreement reached with Sudan resolving “certain claims of United States victims of terror and their families.”  Following a 45-day Congressional notification window, the designation may be rescinded.  Sudan is currently the only country designated as requiring export licenses for Anti-Terrorism (AT) purposes on the Commerce Country Chart that is not subject to comprehensive restrictions.  This requirement should be revised following the formal rescission.